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Mortgage Foreclosure in
Pennsylvania*
I.

Introduction

Mortgage foreclosure is a proceeding, usually statutory, of enforcing payment of a mortgage-secured debt by taking and selling
the mortgaged property.' The vast majority of mortgage foreclosures that annually occur in the United States involve residential
dwellings, and a high proportion of the foreclosure victims are lowincome families.2 Accordingly, to insure that mortgagors were
treated fairly during foreclosure proceedings, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act No. 6 in 1974.3 The Act has had a major impact
on the law of mortgage foreclosure in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless,
no study concerning the Act has been published since its enactment
six years ago, 4 despite the substantial body of case law construing
Act No. 6. The purpose of this note, therefore, is to provide the
reader with an up-to-date primer regarding this important area of
Pennsylvania debtor and creditor relations.
II.

Mortgages in Pennsylvania

The ordinary mortgage consists of two instruments-the note or
bond, and the mortgage instrument itself.6 The mortgage is simply a
security for the payment of the note, with a right of a lien on the
mortgaged premises to enforce payment.7 As one court succinctly
stated, "The mortgagor is simply in the position of a person who
owes money to another and has given him collateral as security for
* Thomas J. Rueter, B.A. University of Scranton 1977; J.D. Dickinson School of Law
1980; Law Clerk, U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of any member of the federal
judiciary.
1. Dikeman v. Jewel Gold Mining Co., 13 F.2d 118, 118 (9th Cir. 1926); Realty Mortgage Co. v. Moore, 80 Fla. 2, 12, 85 So. 155, 159 (1920).
2. See Madway, A Mortgage Foreclosure Primer, 8 CLEARING HOUSE REV. 146, 146
(1974), in which the author states that there were 132,335 mortgage foreclosures in the United
States during 1972.
3, 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-605 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
4. Act No. 6 was signed into law by the Governor on January 30, 1974.
5. See notes 70-105 and accompanying text infra.
6. Note, Acceleration Clauses in Notes and Mortgages, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 94, 96 (1939).
7. Beaver County Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 489, 187 A. 481, 484
(1936); L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 54, at 53-54

(8th ed. 1928).

the payment of this obligation."'
Mortgage instruments nearly always include an acceleration
clause,9 which is a clause "providing that if the mortgagor fails to
pay any of his payments when due or breaches any of the other covenants in the mortgage instrument, the balance of the obligation becomes immediately due and owing."'" An acceleration clause is
often inserted in the note as well."I Most mortgage instruments provide that the mortgagee will have the option to accelerate the maturity of the mortgage debt if the mortgagor fails to meet installments of
principal or interest, to pay taxes or assessments, to maintain insurance upon any structures on the land, or to discharge liens against
the property. 2 The mortgage agreement may also give the lender
the option to accelerate if the mortgagor breaches a covenant to keep
the property in repair or to protect it from waste. 13
Pennsylvania courts have sanctioned acceleration clauses as legitimate contractual stipulations. 14 Such clauses, however, have
been strictly construed against the mortgagees who drafted them.' 5
For example, in Michael Lee, Inc. v. Children'sDevelopmental Center,
Inc., 16 the mortgage instrument contained a covenant whereby the
mortgage debtor promised to keep the mortgaged premises insured.
The acceleration clause in the agreement, however, did not expressly
provide that the due date of the debt could be accelerated upon failure of the mortgagor to keep the premises insured. Even though the
mortgagor failed to purchase the required insurance, the court nonetheless refused to permit the mortgagee to accelerate the majority of
the mortgage debt. The court stated that
where the acceleration provision is not couched in language broad
enough to include or apply to a covenant respecting insurance,
then acceleration for default in conforming to the insurance coverage cannot be supported; that is to say, a mere breach of covenant
to insure or pay over proceeds will not confer a right to immediate
foreclosure in the absence of language in the mortgage authorizing
foreclosure. "
Similarly, in United States v. Angel, 18 the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a mortgagee cannot
8. United States v. Angel, 362 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
9. See generally note 6 supra. See also Henkel & Seltzer, Acceleration Clauses in Mortgages.- Misuse During Periodsof Tight Money, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 441 (1980).
10. Maday, supra note 2, at 178.
11. Prather, Foreclosureof the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 426.
12. Id. at 426.
13. Id See, e.g., United States v. Angel, 362 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
14. Eg., Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Bd. of the Am. Baptist Churches v. Goldsworthy, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, 328-29, 385 A.2d 358, 362 (1978).
15. Michael Lee, Inc. v. Children's Developmental Center, Inc., 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 642
(C.P. Adams 1974).
16. Id
17. Id at 646.
18. 362 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

invoke an acceleration clause or foreclose a mortgage because of a
breach of covenant against waste or for maintenance and repair, unless the value of the mortgaged property has been impaired by the
breach. The mortgagee has the burden of proving such an impairment. 19
Another important clause in many mortgage agreements and
notes in Pennsylvania is the cognovit clause, whereby the mortgagor
gives the mortgagee a power of attorney to confess judgment against
him in the event of his default.2"
III. The Procedure of Mortgage Foreclosure
In Pennsylvania, mortgage foreclosure is governed by the Rules
of Civil Procedure, 2 ' which must be strictly followed.2 2 The action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint 23 in which the plaintiff must
name as defendants the mortgagor, or the personal representative or
heir of a deceased mortgagor, and the actual owner of the mortgaged
property.24 Service of the complaint is either by personal service, or
by publication and mailing of the notice when personal service is not
possible.25
The defendant may counterclaim2 6 and has the opportunity at
trial to set up defenses against the foreclosure.2 7 After hearing any
defenses, the court may enter judgment for the amount due the
lender if the court determines that there has been a default and that
the mortgagee has a right to foreclose.2" The mortgagee is also entitled to recover reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, that are
incurred in bringing the foreclosure action.29
Once a plaintiff obtains a judgment, notice must be given to the
public that the mortgaged property is to be sold at a sheriff's sale."
The notice and advertisement of the sale are required to be in the
19. Id at 447.
20. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Slawek, - Pa. Super. Ct. _ 409 A.2d 420
(1979); 13 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179:130 (1973) (Pennsylvania mortgage form).
21. PA. R. Civ. P. 1141-1164 & 3180-3183.
22. See First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Greene County v. Porter, 408 Pa. 236, 183
A.2d 318 (1962).
23. PA. R. Civ. P. 1143 & 1147.
24. 1d 1144.
25. Id 1145.
26. Id. 1148.
27. First Nat'l Bank of Jamestown v. Scofield, 168 Pa. 407, 31 A. 1012 (1895); 25 PA. L.
ENCY. Mortgages § 209, at 55 (1960). See also notes 106-113 and accompanying text infra.
28. PA. R. Civ. P. 1149. Cf Landau v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, 445 Pa. 217, 226, 282
A.2d 335, 340 (1971) ("Judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action must be entered for a sum
certain or no execution could ever issue on it.").
29. Eastgate Enterprises, Inc. v. Bank and Trust Co. of Old York Rd., 236 Pa. Super. Ct.
503, 505 n.1, 345 A.2d 279, 280 n.I (1975); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 406(2) (Purdon Supp.
1979-80).
30. PA. R. Civ. P. 3181(f) & 3129.

same manner and form as in the case of other real property sold at
public sale to satisfy other debts or damages. 3 '
If the sale price of the mortgaged land exceeds the mortgage
debt, the mortgagor has the right to receive from the proceeds of the
sale the amount in excess of the mortgage debt. 32 The mortgagee,
however, is permitted to bid at the sheriffs sale 33 and, in practice, he
is often the only or the highest bidder. 34 If the mortgagee bids no
more than the unpaid amount of the obligation secured by the mortgage, he need not pay anything for the property. The bid price is
merely applied to the mortgage debt.3 5
After the mortgaged property is sold at a public auction, the
sheriff executes a deed to the purchaser;36 court confirmation of the
sale is not required. 37 The effect of a mortgage foreclosure and sale
thereunder is to extinguish the mortgagor's interest in the property,
and to transfer title to the purchaser as fully as it existed in the mortgagor at the date of the mortgage. 38 All intervening estates and interests acquired subsequent to the mortgage are also defeated. 39 The
mortgage debtor may file a petition with the court in equity 40 to have
the sheriff's sale set aside for inadequacy of price or irregularity in
alone is not
the sale; 4 ' however, "mere inadequacy of price standing
42
a sufficient basis for setting aside a sheriffs sale."
IV.

The Mortgagor's Personal Liability and Deficiency
Judgments

The judgment entered in an action of mortgage foreclosure is a
judgment against the land (de terris) and imposes no personal liability upon the mortgagor against whom the judgment is obtained.4 3
Even though a sheriff's sale may be for a price less than the debt, the
sale discharges the mortgage and releases the mortgage debtor from
liability, unless the mortgagor has made an independent promise to
31. Id
32. In re Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n, 308 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1962) (applying Pennsylvania law).
33. Baker v. Bailey, 204 Pa. 524, 54 A. 326 (1903); 25 PA. L. ENCY. Mortgages § 254, at
100 (1960).
34. Madway, supra note 2, at 170; Prather, supra note 11,at 429.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. PA. R. Civ. P. 31816) & 3135.
37. PA.R. Civ. P. 3135.
38. Florida First Bon Capital Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 448, 451,
397 A.2d 838, 841 (1979).
39. Id at 451-52, 397 A.2d at 841.
40. Doherty v. Adal Corp., 437 Pa. 109, 261 A.2d 311 (1970).
41.

Id

42. Fidelity Bank v. Pierson, 437 Pa. 541, 544, 264 A.2d 682, 684 (1970).
43. Meco Realty Co. v. Bums, 414 Pa. 495, 200 A.2d 869 (1964); National Council of the
Junior Order of United Am. Mechanics v. Zytnick, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 391, 293 A.2d 112
(1972).

pay apart from the mere giving of the mortgage." This independent
promise to pay, which makes the mortgagor personally liable, is usually incorporated in the same document as the mortgage agreement.
It may be evidenced, however, by a separate written obligation such
as a bond or note.4 5 When such an independent agreement or promise exists, a foreclosure sale does not affect the mortgagee's right to
realize the full extent of the indebtedness owed to him by the mortgagor, even though the foreclosure sale terminates the lien of the
mortgage.46
For example, if the court enters judgment in favor of the mortgagee for $10,000 in principal, interest, and costs due to the mortgagee under the mortgage, but the property is sold at the sheriff's sale
for only $9,000, the mortgage debt is reduced by $9,000, thus leaving
a deficiency of $1,000 still due and unpaid. Since the mortgagor has
given his personal covenant in the note or mortgage to pay the debt,
the mortgagee may simultaneously 47 or subsequently secure a personal judgment for the deficiency against the mortgagor.48 Such a
judgment is commonly referred to as a deficiency judgment.4 9
In Pennsylvania, any personal liability of the mortgagor resulting from the sale of the mortgaged property for an amount less than
the mortgage debt must be enforced by an independent action on the
note or bond as if there were no mortgage.5 0 If the mortgagee, however, was the purchaser at the sheriffs sale, he must comply with the
procedure set forth in the Deficiency Judgment Act before he can
bring this separate action."'
The Deficiency Judgment Act is a child of the Great Depression. During the early thirties when the Depression was at its height,
there was much criticism of deficiency judgments because a mortgagee often had complete control of the bid price at the sheriffs sale.
Mortgagees often purchased mortgaged property at foreclosure sales
at scandalously low prices so that almost the entire amount of a
mortgage debt could be taken in the form of a deficiency judgment.5 2
Reacting to this practice, Pennsylvania and other legislatures enacted laws providing that a deficiency judgment must be limited to
44. Meco Realty Co. v. Bums, 414 Pa. 495, 200 A.2d 869 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Mollenauer v. Smith, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 517 (1912).
46. In re White's Estate, 322 Pa. 85, 185 A. 589 (1936).
47. See Kretschman v. Stoll, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 51, 352 A.2d 439 (1975), in which the
court held that a deficiency judgment may be entered against a mortgagor when two conditions exist: (1) the mortgagee in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings petitions for both an in
rem judgment against the property and for an in personam judgment against the mortgagor;
and (2) no objection is made by the mortgagor to the joinder of the two judgments.
48. See Prather, supra note i1,at 438.
49. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh-Duquesne Dev. Co., 482 F.2d 243, 246 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. 25 PA. L. ENCY. Mortgages § 273, at 124 (1960). See generally Skilton, Assessing the
Mortgage Debtor's PersonalLiability, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 440 (1942).
51. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
52. Prather, supra note 11, at 438.

the difference between the mortgage debt and the "fair market
value" of the mortgaged property. This may or may not be the price
paid at the foreclosure sale.53 These deficiency judgment statutes
were held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
Honeyman v. Jacobs,54 in which the Court ruled that the acts did not
violate the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of
contractual obligations.
The Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act5 5 provides that
mortgagees who bring a foreclosure action, and who have bought the
mortgaged property at the sheriff's sale, can recover a deficiency
judgment only if they obtain a personal judgment and petition the
court to fix the fair market value of the purchased realty no later
than six months5 6 after the sheriff's sale.57 The mortgagor will be
released and discharged from liability to the extent of the fair market
value as determined by the court. 58 If the mortgagee fails to file a
petition within the statutory period, the mortgagor, or any other person directly or indirectly liable to the mortgagee for payment of the
debt, is released and discharged of such liability to the mortgagee. 59
"Accordingly, where the mortgagee who has purchased at a foreclosure sale fails to have the fair market value of the property fixed
under the procedure set forth in the Act, an irrebutable presumption
arises that the creditor was paid in full and in kind."6
V.

Rights of a Mortgagor During a Foreclosure Proceeding

During a foreclosure proceeding, a mortgagor is afforded significant rights and protections under Pennsylvania law. These are the
mortgagor's common-law right of redemption and the rights and
protections afforded to him by Act No. 6 of 1974.
A.

Right of Redemfption

A defaulting mortgagor of land in Pennsylvania has the right to
redeem the mortgaged property. 6' This right of redemption is sim53. Id at 438-39.
54. 306 U.S. 539 (1939). See generally Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage ForeclosureProcedure-Possibilites Suggested by Honeyman Y.Jacobs, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 957 (1940).
Pennsylvania's Deficiency Judgment Act has also been held constitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which ruled that the Act did not conflict with the constitutional provision prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Allen, 343 Pa. 428, 22 A.2d 896 (1941).
55. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103 (Purdon Supp; 1979).
56. Id § 5522(b)(2).
57. See Note, The 1941 Deciency Judgment Act, 16 TEMP. L.Q. 72 (1941-42).
58. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
59. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Guy Heavener, Inc., 16 Pa. Comniw. Ct. 386, 328
A.2d 590 (1974).
60. In re Sturgeon Condemnation Case, 25 Bucks 212, 213 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
61. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Broad St. Hosp., 354

ply the right to require the holder of the mortgage "to receive payment of the matured debt and to satisfy the lien."'6 2 While
Pennsylvania has no statute regulating the exercise of the right of
redemption, two court-made rules have developed. First, a clause in
a mortgage instrument that restricts the right of redemption to the
mortgagor personally is void and will not be enforced by the
courts.6 3 And second, a mortgagor's right of redemption ends with
the fall of the auctioneer's hammer at the sheriffs sale of the mortgaged land. 4
In contrast to the Pennsylvania rule, twenty-six states 65 provide
a statutory right of redemption that allows additional time after the
foreclosure sale, in some instances up to two years, during which the
mortgagor can regain his property by paying a certain sum of money
to the purchaser of the mortgaged property.6 6 A few also provide
that the mortgagor remain in possession during the statutory redemption period.6 7
The Pennsylvania Legislature has wisely refrained from enacting a statute authorizing redemption after a foreclosure sale. Most
commentators and courts agree that sale redemption statutes are unsound primarily because they unduly prolong the period of time
before a purchaser at a foreclosure sale can acquire an indefeasible
title. 68 These statutes, therefore, discourage a buyer from paying the
fair market value for property sold at a foreclosure sale. As one
court has skeptically asked,
What third party would bid and pay the full market value, knowing that he cannot have the property to do with as he wishes until
a set period has gone by, and that at the end of the period he may
not get it, but instead may be forced to accept a payment
which
69
may or may not fully reimburse him for his outlays?
B. Act No. 6 of 1974
Act No. 6,70 which became effective March 31, 1974, provides
protective safeguards for a mortgagor before a foreclosure action on
Pa. 123, 47 A.2d 281 (1946). See generally G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES, §§ 302-310, at 624-46 (1970).

62.

Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Broad St. Hosp., 354

Pa. 123, 126, 47 A.2d 281, 282 (1946).

63. Johnston v. Gray, 16 Serg. & Rawl. 361, 365 (Pa. 1827). Accord, G. OSBORNE, supra
note 61, § 97 at 146.
64. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Broad St. Hosp., 354
Pa. 123, 47 A.2d 281 (1946).
65. United States v. Stadium Apartments, 425 F.2d 358, 364 (9th Cir.), cert. deniedsub.
nom., Lynch v. United States, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
66. See Madway, supra note 2, at 149; Prather, supra note 11, at 431-32.
67. See Madway, supra note 2, at 149.
68. See, e.g., Prather, supra note 11, at 432.
69. United States v. Stadium Apartments, 425 F.2d 358, 365-66 (9th Cir.), cert. deniedsub
non, Lynch v. United States, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
70. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-605 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).

a residential mortgage may be instituted. Under the Act, "a mortgagee is precluded from accelerating the maturity date of the mortgage
debt and commencing foreclosure proceedings, despite the existence
of a default, until after the mortgagor is given notice of the default
and his right to cure it."'" The Act applies to all mortgages created
after the passage of the Act, as well as to cases where the mortgage
was executed prior to the effective date of the Act but the default
occurred subsequent to that date.72 The Pennsylvania Superior
Court has recently held that this retroactive application of the Act is
not an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations.7 3
1. Mortgages to Which the Act Applies. -Act No. 6 applies
only to "residential mortgages." 74 The Act defines "residential mortgage" as mortgages in which the amount of principal is $50,000 or
less and is secured by a lien upon real estate located within Pennsylvania on which are one or two residential units.75 The term, however, applies "only to transactions where the principal purpose of the
transaction is the purchase of, or improvement or repair in connection with the acquisition of, residential real property .
-" Thus,
if the principal amount of the loan is over $50,000 or if the main
purpose of the transaction is not the purchase, improvement, or repair of residential real estate, the Act will not apply. Accordingly,
one court has held that when a mortgage is given not in connection
with the purchase, improvement, or repair of realty, but rather to
secure a loan for the purchase of a sailboat, Act No. 6 does not apply
and a foreclosing mortgagee does not have to comply with the requirements of the Act.77
2. When Notice Must Be Given. -Before the enactment of Act
No. 6, a mortgagee could accelerate the loan upon default by the
mortgagor without giving notice, and acceleration could not be de71. Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Bd. of the Am. Baptist Churches v. Goldsworthy,
253 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, 329, 385 A.2d 358, 362 (1978). Other jurisdictions have similar curative
default statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924(c) (West 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-39-118 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95, § 57 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 86.760 (1977). See generally Pedowitz,MortgageForeclosure Underthe Uniform Land TransactionsAct, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 179 (1978); Note, Foreclosures, Redemptions, and Homeowners,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 335; 52 DEN. L.J. 637 (1975).
72. Market St. Nat'l Bank of Shamokin v. Staniszewski, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 283 (C.P.
Northumb. 1977).
73. Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Bd. of the Am. Baptist Churches, 253 Pa. Super.
Ct. 321, 385 A.2d 358 (1978). Contra, State Capital Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Hilton, 24 Chest.
71 (Pa. C.P. 1976).
74. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
75. Id
76. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Slawek, - Pa. Super. Ct. _., n.9, 409 A.2d 420, 424
n.9 (1979) (quoting 1978 Amendments to Act No. 6).
77. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Slawek, - Pa. Super. Ct. __ n.9, 409 A.2d 420, 424
n.9 (1979).

feated by the mortgagor's willingness to cure the default.7 8 Act No. 6
now requires that written notice be given to the mortgagor at least
thirty days before the mortgagee may accelerate the maturity of the
mortgage, commence any legal action, or take possession of any security for the mortgage.79 Notice is not required, however, if the
mortgagor has abandoned or voluntarily surrendered the mortgaged
property; 80 nor must notice be given before a mortgagee confesses
judgment against the mortgagor.8 l The notice required by the Act
must be sent by registered or certified mail to the mortgagor's last
known address and, if different, to the residence that is the subject of
the mortgage.8 2
3. Personsto Whom Notice Must Be Given-Act No. 6 requires
that notice of foreclosure be sent to a "residential mortgage
debtor. ' 83 Section 101 of the Act defines this term as "a non-corporate borrower who is obligated to a residential mortgage lender to
repay in whole or in part a residential mortgage and a successive
record owner of the property, if any, who gives notice thereof to the
residential mortgage lender." 84 This definition is broad enough to
require that notice be given to any guarantor or endorser of the note
or bond, and any former owner of the mortgaged property who remains liable for the mortgage debt. 85 Separate notices should also be
given to a husband and wife when they are both liable for the indebtedness.8 6
4. Contents of the Notice.-Section 403(c) of the Act provides
that the notice must clearly and conspicuously state: (1) the identity
of the security document and the mortgaged property; (2) the nature
of the default claimed; (3) the right of the debtor to cure the default
and exactly what performance, including what sum of money, if any,
must be tendered to cure the default; (4) the time within which the
debtor must cure the default; (5) the method or methods by which
the mortgagor's ownership or possession of the real estate may be
terminated; and (6) any right of the debtor to transfer the property
subject to the mortgage, or to refinance the loan, and any right of the
78. See Atkinson v. Walton, 162 Pa. 219, 29 A. 898 (1894); Robinson- v. Loomis, 51 Pa.
78 (1865). See also Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Bd. of the Am. Baptist Churches v.
Goldsworthy, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, 329, 385 A.2d 358, 362 (1978).
79. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-8 1).
80. Id at § 403(d).
81. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Slawek, - Pa. Super. Ct. - 409 A.2d 420 (1979).
82.

41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-8 1).

83.

ld § 403(a).

84. Id § 101.
85. Auten, Disclosure Requirements and Reinstatement Rightsfor Residential Mortgages
Under Act No. 6, in PA. BAR INSTITUTE, PA. MORTGAGE INTEREST AND USURY LAW, ACT
No. 6 OF 1974, 19 (1974).
86. Id

transferee to cure the default.87
There has been much litigation in the trial courts over what type
of notice satisfies the requirements of Act No. 6.88 Most courts have
required that the notice specifically contain all of the above six items
of information. For example, in CharlesH. Salmon Building & Loan
Association v. Mroz,89 the court held that a notice of a mortgage
foreclosure proceeding was insufficient when it failed to clearly explain that foreclosure involves acceleration of the maturity of the
mortgage, that the mortgagor can cure the default up to one hour
before the start of the sheriffs sale, and that the mortgagor may be
obligated for attorney's fees as a result of the foreclosure.
The courts have also ruled that a notice of foreclosure under Act
No. 6 is inadequate when the mortgagor's rights and obligations are
spelled out in legalistic terms drawn largely from "the complex and
turgid language of the statute" so as not to be readily understood by
a layman. 90 As one court has stated, "[Tihe language of the notice
must be reasonably understandable to a person of average intellect."'"
In Charles H Salmon Building & Loan Association v. Mroz,9 2
the court discussed the "clear and conspicuous" requirement of Act
No. 6 notices. Analogizing to the definition of "conspicuous" in the
Uniform Commercial Code, the court held that simply incorporating
a statement of the mortgagor's rights in a letter advising of possible
mortgage foreclosure proceedings is inadequate without any emphasis. In order to be conspicuous, such statements must be underscored, written in relatively large letters, written in a different color,
or emphasized in some other way to catch the attention of a reader
93
of ordinary intelligence.
Two recent decisions, however, have properly rejected this requirement of special emphasis. 94 These courts have held that since
Act No. 6 mandates that six items of information be conspicuously
stated in the notice, to capitalize, italicize, or underline them all
would be meaningless. 95 "Where a series of matters are of equal
87. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
88. See, e.g., Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Leipold, II Pa. D. & C.3d 659 (C.P.
York 1979); Piper v. Oakes, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 722 (C.P. Adams 1979); Mid-Penn Consumer
Discount Co. v. Chamberlain, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 752 (C.P. Phila. 1978).
89. 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 59 (C.P. Phila. 1977).
90. Fidelity Bond and Mortgage Co. v. Clark, 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 742, 748 (C.P. Phila.
1978). Accord, Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. v. Chamberlain, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 752 (C.P.
Phila. 1979).
91. Fidelity Bond and Mortgage Co. v. Clark, 7 Pa. D. & C.3d 742, 747 (C.P. Phila.
1978).
92. 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 59 (C.P. Phila. 1977).
93. fd at 61-2.
94. Piper v. Oakes, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 722 (C.P. Adams 1979); Federal Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n v. Ayala, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 712 (C.P. Phila. 1978).
95. Id

importance, there is no necessity for contrast in lettering used." 9 6
5. Right to Curea Default.-After a notice of intention to foreclose has been given by the mortgagee, Act No. 6 permits a mortgagor to cure his default at any time within one hour before the start of
the sheriff's sale, thereby avoiding acceleration and preventing the
sale or other disposition of his real estate.9 7 The Actprovides that in
order to cure a default a mortgage debtor must do the following:
(1) Pay or tender in the form of cash, cashier's check or certified check, all sums which would have been due at the time of
payment or tender in the absence of default and the exercise of an
acceleration clause, if any;
(2) Perform any other obligation which he would have been
bound to perform in the absence of default or the exercise of an
acceleration clause, if any;
(3) Pay or tender any reasonable fees. . . and the reasonable
costs of proceeding to foreclosure as specified in writing by the
residential mortgage lender actually incurred to the date of payment.
(4) Pay any reasonable late penalty, if provided for in the security document.98
A cured default by tendering the appropriate amount or performance restores the mortgagor to the same position as if the default had
not occurred. 99 To protect the mortgagee, however, from a mortgagor who is habitually in default, the Act provides that a default may
not be cured more than three times a year.'0°
Not all mortgage defaults can be cured under Act No. 6. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Ministers & Missionaries Beneft
Board of the American\Baptist Churches v. Goldsworthy,'0 ' recently
examined Act No. 6 and stated that the "ability to prevent foreclosure and avoid acceleration . . . is distinctively delimited; it necessarily presupposes the existence of a default curable in the prescribed
manner." 0 2 The court ruled that while the Act does not specify the
type of default that may be cured, it nonetheless relates almost exclusively to monetary defaults. 0 3 Consequently, the court held that Act
No. 6 does not allow the cure of a default based upon a conveyance
of the mortgaged premises in violation of the mortgage agreement, 104
and, thus, the mortgagor could only prevent foreclosure by exercis96.
1978).
97.
98.
99.

Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Ayala, 8 Pa. D. & C.3d 712, 717-18 (C.P. Phila.
41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 404(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
Id § 404(b).
Id § 404(c).

100. Id § 404(a).
101.
102.
103.
104.

253 Pa. Super. Ct. 321, 385 A.2d 358 (1978).
Id at 332, 385 A.2d at 364.
Id at 333, 385 A.2d at 364.
Id

ing his right of redemption. 105
VI.

Defenses to Mortgage Foreclosure

If the mortgagor is unable to cure his default, his or her attorney
must then consider what defenses are available to prevent the foreclosure sale. In Pennsylvania, there are essentially two kinds of defenses to a mortgage foreclosure-statutory and contract.
A.

Statutory Defenses

One defense that can be raised is the failure of the mortgagee to
comply strictly with the mortgage foreclosure provisions of the Rules
of Civil Procedure,"°6 or Act No. 6. For example, it has been held
that a sheriffs sale of real estate following a mortgage foreclosure
must be set aside if the mortgagee neglected to give sufficient notice
of intention to foreclose as required by Act No. 6.107 A technical
failure to adhere to the Rules of Civil Procedure or the notice requirements of Act No. 6 should be pleaded as a defense by filing
preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to strike rather than
a demurrer. 0 8
Another defense that can be advanced is the failure of the mortgagee to fulfill the disclosure requirements of the federal Truth in
Lending Act.'0 9 Depending upon the type of transaction, the mortgagee may be liable to the mortgagor in damages and the loan transaction may be subject to recission if there has been a violation of the
disclosure requirements."' Similarly, a mortgagor may also allege
as a defense the mortgagee's noncompliance with the statutes and
regulations of the Federal Housing Administration, Farmers Home
Administration, or Veterans Administration if the defendant in the
foreclosure action is a participant in one of these agencies' mortgage
financing programs. I"
B.

Contract Defenses

Since a mortgage is simply a contract between a debtor and a
creditor, a mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding may establish a
number of traditional contract defenses, including failure to prove a
105. See notes 61-69 and accompanying text supra.
106. PA. R. Civ. P. 1141-1164 & 3180-3183.
107. Farmers Trust Co. v. Murray, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 41 (C.P. Snyder 1975).
108. Piper v. Oakes, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 722, 728 (C.P. Adams 1979); PA. R. Civ. P. 1017.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1977).
110. See Madway, A Mortgage Foreclosure Primer Part 1, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 250,
250-51 (1974), for a lengthy discussion on how to use the disclosure requirements of the Truth
in Lending Act as a defense in a foreclosure proceeding.
111. For a discussion of defenses based upon a mortgagee's noncompliance with the statutes and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration, Farmers Home Administration,
and the Veterans Administration, see id at 251-57; Madway, supra note 2, at 168.

default, waiver of any default,"2 estoppel, fraud, duress, usury, failure of consideration, and mistake.' '
VII.

Conclusion

Mortgage foreclosure law generally attempts to achieve an equitable balance between the interests of the mortgage lender and the
mortgagor.' ' To this end, the Pennsylvania Legislature and judiciary have endeavored to provide a speedy and inexpensive method by
which a mortgagee can recover the total amount of the money it lent
to the mortgagor while simultaneously insuring that a mortgage
debtor is not deprived of his property without adequate procedural
safeguards. With the passage of Act No. 6 in 1974, Pennsylvania has
come close to reaching this objective.
Critics of the present system argue that a defaulting mortgagor
can easily abuse the safeguards afforded to him by Act No. 6. For
example, a debtor can unjustly delay the foreclosure sale by pleading
a mortgagee's technical failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Act, even though he has been sufficiently informed of
the lender's intention to foreclose and has ample time to cure his
default so as to avoid the loss of his real estate. A mortgagor may
also commit three defaults within one year and still avoid a foreclosure sale by tendering the appropriate payment or performance after
each default.
Although the system does favor the mortgage debtor, this preferential treatment is fair, particularly when a residential mortgagor
is the defendant in the foreclosure action. A residential mortgagor
has more at stake in a foreclosure proceeding than does the mortgagee. The gravity of the interest of the residential mortgagor - the
possible loss of his home - far outweighs the mortgage lender's interest in securing the repayment of its loan. Consequently, if the Pennsylvania Legislature and judiciary have failed in their attempt to
give equal weight to the competing interests of the parties, it is better
that they have erred in favor of the mortgagor.

112. Cf. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Street Road Shopping Center, Inc., 68 Pa. D. &
C.2d 751 (C.P. Bucks 1975) (mere delay of suit or neglect to exact rigorously his money upon
the day it was due is not evidence of a waiver of a mortgagee's contract rights).
113. For a detailed analysis of the contract defenses available to a mortgagor in a foreclosure action, see Madway, supra note 2, at 173-78; 25 PA. L. ENCY. Mortgages §§ 209 & 225, at
55-57 & 68-72 (1960).
114. Prather, supra note 1I, at 420.

